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Douglas M. Johnston* Stresses and Mind-sets
in Fishery Management
This paper reviews the evolution of fishery management as a field of cross-
disciplinary inquiry and suggests that each participating discipline tends to be
attracted to its own range of explanatory theories and to its own stock of relevant
data. Impacts of fishery failure are experienced at different levels of society, each
suggesting a different approach to remedial action. The fishery collapse in
Atlantic Canada should be studied from a comparative perspective in order to
gather ideas on how to cope more effectively with the socio-economic conse-
quences. Above all, however, the disaster should be seen as an unprecedented
challenge for the fishery management experts in Canada to integrate their mind-
sets despite the intellectual stresses inherent in the field.
I. Fishery Management as a Field
Fishery policy is one of the most elusive sectors of public policy. Indeed,
fishery "systems" may not be amenable to "control" over an extended
period. When commercial fishing fails spectacularly, as in Atlantic
Canada in the 1990s, it causes enormous social and economic distress.
Understandably, victims of a systemic failure tend to blame the experts.
What, they might ask, are the prospects of ever attaining the goal of
control within such a volatile industry?'
Those responsible for the design and operation of fishery policy
belong to the field of fishery management. More or less consciously, such
designers and operators are influenced by the growing stock of knowl-
edge and experience associated with the complex problems of fishery
development and management. Fields such as fishery management,
unlike disciplines, come into existence in response to real-world problems
* Professor Emeritus, University of Victoria, M.A., LL.B., MCL, LLM, JSD. Founding
Director of MELP, co-founder of Dalhousie's Ocean Studies Programme (DOSP) and of the
Southeast Asian Programme in Ocean Law, Policy and Management (SEAPOL). Author or
editor of numerous works in the field of international law and policy, with special emphasis on
fisheries, marine pollution, ocean boundary-making, and treaty-making. Currently Adjunct
Professor at Dalhousie Law School.
1. On the boom-and-bust history of the Canadian fishing industry, see L.S. Parsons, Manage-
ment of Marine Fisheries in Canada in Canadian Bulletin of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences,
vol. 225 (Ottawa: National Research Council of Canada and Dept. of Fisheries and Oceans,
1993) at 345-393. For a brief history of Canadian fishery management, see J. Gough, "A
Historical Sketch of Fisheries Management in Canada" in L.S. Parsons and W.H. Lear, eds.,
Perspectives on Canadian Marine Fisheries Management (Ottawa: National Research Coun-
cil of Canada and Dept. of Fisheries and Oceans, 1993) 5.
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for which governments accept responsibility. Since complex problems
have many aspects, research related to design and operation must be
integrated into a cross-disciplinary frame of reference.
Fishery management originated in the 1880s as a subdiscipline: a
subset of marine biology. Between then and the late 1940s the discourse
on fishery management, pivoting on the concept of "conservation", was
monopolized by biologists. Both at national and international levels, the
objectives and methods of fishery management were the product of this
new infant science, fishery biology.2
However, in the period between the late 1940s and the early 1970s the
continuing dominance of biology was subjected to increasingly critical
challenge from economists, who were interested in adapting what had
been learned in the area of forest management to the needs of fishery
management.3 The biologically developed objective of maximum sus-
tainable yield4, the emphasis on biological research (e.g. population
dynamics and stock assessment), and the statistical analysis of landings,
which played a central role in the biologist's mind-set, had to contend
with economically defined objectives such as economic yield, with the
economic concepts of rent and efficiency, and with the techniques of
access allocation, entry limitation, and individual quotas.5
At the time when the economists might have begun to displace the
biologists as the chief influence on fishery management designers and
operators, both the economists and the biologists had to yield to the new
imperatives introduced at the global level of diplomacy at the Third U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS Ill).6 The key delegates
responsible for negotiating fishery management provisions at UNCLOS MI
were required, of course, to reflect the third world developmental ethic of
2. On modem biological theories of the effects of fishing, see Parsons, ibid. at 42-51. Many
of the earlier fishery biologists were inclined to regard "depletion" as "little more than a bogie
to frighten the credulous". Cited by Gough, ibid. at 32.
3. Canadian economists were preeminent among the pioneers in this new area of specializa-
tion, especially H. Scott Gordon and Anthony Scott. Other Canadians prominent today in this
sub-discipline include Colin Clark, Parzival Copes, Gordon Munro, and Peter Pearse.
4. The clash between the two disciplines first took place in the 19 50s and early 1960s over the
objectives of fishery management. Biologists at that time were more or less united behind the
concept of maximum sustainable yield (MSY), but the economists insisted on the primacy of
maximum economic yield (MEY), and struggled for recognition of the need for bio-economic
models. Since the 1970s both MSY and MEY have been replaced in Canada by the ambiguous,
but politically and socially sensitive, goal of optimum yield (OY), which is designed to reflect
and accommodate the diverse, legitimate but conflicting, objectives of fishery management.
Parsons, supra note 1 at 57-76.
5. Canadian experience with these techniques applied to various fisheries is described in detail
in Parsons, supra note 1 at 117-221.
6. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982); 21
I.L.M. 1261.
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the 1970s and to respond to demands for coastal state autonomy over
fishery resources far distant from the shoreline.7 To carry through bold
initiatives for the extension of coastal state jurisdiction, deals had to be
struck by diplomats mandated to restructure the law of the sea. Compro-
mise diplomacy required lawyers to draft fishery management language
that would give an extraordinarily high degree of discretionary authority,
couched in eclectic terminology, to coastal states within these new
extended limits of national jurisdiction.' At the same time, those wishing
to exploit the living resources of the high seas areas beyond these limits
were left free to do so without the burden of explicit environmental
responsibility. 9
The ethic of coastal entitlement applied to coastal states in the 1970s
passed down quickly to the sub-national level of coastal communities.
The concept of disadvantaged, peripheral fishing communities, in gener-
ally rich as well as generally poor countries, was articulated by sociolo-
gists. Concern for vulnerable, fish-dependent, coastal communities be-
came a powerfully emotive factor in national fishery management, not
least in "sympathetic" political systems such as Canada. 10
Since the mid-1980s, the field of fishery management has been
complicated further through the provision of environmental perspective
and the insistence of ecologists on the need for a holistic orientation.
Rationalized by the reference to the Brundtland concept of sustainabilitytt
and framed by the Rio prescriptions of Agenda 21,12 a new anti-sectoral
approach to fishery management is envisaged, which would require
7. On the relevance of these changes to Canada, see D.M. Johnston, Canada and the New
International Law of the Sea, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) at 5-9, 24-30.
8. D.M. Johnston, The International Law of Fisheries: A Framework for Policy-Oriented
Inquiries (New Haven: New Haven Press and Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) at XLIV - LXXV.
9. For an early and trenchant environmental critique of the UNCLOS III fishery provisions,
see C. de Klemm, "Living Resources of the Ocean" in D.M. Johnston, ed., The Environmental
Law of the Sea (Gland: IUCN, 1981) at 71. See also D. VanderZwaag, "The Management of
Straddling Stocks: Stilling the Troubled Waters of the Grand Banks" in D. VanderZwaag, ed.,
Canadian Ocean Law and Policy (Markham: Butterworths, 1992) at 115.
10. On the social dimension of Canadian fishery management, see Parsons, supra note 1 at
395-440. Curiously, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans does not employ a single
sociologist - or at least did not as recently as 1992. A senior government official admits this
is "puzzling given the high visibility of social issues, and the continual tug-of-war between
economic and social factors in fisheries management". Ibid. at 621. On the "social/community"
paradigm, in contrast with the "conservation" and "rationalization" paradigms, see A.T.
Charles, "Canadian Fisheries: Paradigms and Policy" in D. VanderZwaag, ed., supra note 9
at 3.
11. On the relevance of "sustainable development" to habitat and fishery management in
Canada, see Parsons, supra note 1 at 529-530.
12. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). Agenda 21:
Programme ofActionforSustainable Development. UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/26, 13 June 1992
(New York: UN Dept. of Public Information, 1993).
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fishery management decision-making to be incorporated into a system of
"integrated coastal management". 
13
The recent tragic failure of the Canadian Atlantic ground fishery, and
of other ocean food production systems elsewhere, gives urgency to the
need for answers that would explain why crises occur so frequently in
fishery management and what, if anything, can be done to establish a
firmer foundation for fishing communities around the world. Unfortu-
nately, the answers offered vary with the perspective provided by
discipline and vocation.
1I. Explanatory Theories
Biologists involved in fishery management can be expected to concede
the existence of occasional scientific error or miscalculation, but no
affordable level of research can remove the factor of scientific uncer-
tainty. Moreover, all arguments for concentrating research effort in a
particular area of investigation are a function of personal or institutional
bias within the scientific community, derived from a particular hypoth-
esis of choice such as recruitment level, change of temperature, toxicity
tolerance level, fresh water run-off, bacteriological infection, or preda-
tor-prey relationship. 4 Within any research institution, choice of re-
search focus is essentially a budgetary decision influenced by political
considerations within the organization or profession. Research may
ultimately produce a cure for most or all forms of cancer, but science
unaided will never "solve" the problems of fishery management. 5
13. B. Cicin-Sain, "Sustainable Development and Integrated Coastal Management" (1993)
21 Ocean and Coastal Management 11.
14. For evidence in support of some of these theories, see H.G. Gade, "When Ice Melts in Sea
Water: A Review" (1993) 31 Atmosphere-Ocean 139; Y. de Lafontaine, "Zooplankton
Biomass in the Southern Golf of St. Lawrence: Spatial Patterns and the Influence of Freshwater
Run Off' (1994) 51 Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 617; Y. Lambert et al., "Effects of Intermediate
and Low Salinity Conditions on Growth Rates and Food Conversion of Atlantic Code (Gadus
Mortva)" (1994) 51 Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 1569; R.I. Perry and S.J. Smith, "Identifying
Habitat Associations of Marine Fishes Using Survey Data: An Application to The Northwest
Atlantic" (1994) 51 Can. J. Fis. Aquat. Sci. 589.
15. The "problems of fishery management" cannot be solved by science because they consist
of an impenetrable complex of virtually unrelated social, economic and political issues as well
as researchable, but not necessarily soluble, scientific problems. They have been said to
include:
"1. natural resource variability, often environmentally determined;
2. the common-property nature of fisheries resources and resultant overcapacity;
3. market fluctuations;
4. heavy dependence on the fisheries in isolated coastal communities;
5. recurrent conflict among competing users; and
6. conflicting objectives for fisheries management." Parsons & Lear, eds., supra
note 1 at I.
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Economists unite in the recognition of industrial overcapacity as the
cause of overfishing and in the call for entry limitation. 6 Some may go
further than others as advocates for individual property rights through
licensing or alternative arrangements.17 But tough economic advice tends
to be politically repugnant, and economists on their own cannot deter-
mine the precise role that over-exploitation plays in recurrent fishery
crises. Moreover, fishery economists, like stock assessment biologists,
are data dependent and therefore often at the mercy of inaccurate catch
statistics distorted by deliberate misreporting. 8
Lawyers are merchants in words rather than facts or figures. But
lawyer's language tends to take on an administrative life of its own,
adding inflexibility of obligation to the stability of purpose which is
bound to be part of the bureaucratic process. Moreover, treaty language
negotiated at the global level, such as the 1982 Convention on the Law of
the Sea, tends to be given an elevated status as "binding" world commu-
nity norm or decision, although it cannot possibly be sensitive to variation
and complexity in local fishery situations. The existence of the Grand
Banks type of "straddling stocks" anomaly was acknowledged at
UNCLOS III, and this problem may soon be alleviated through further
UN diplomacy, 9 but few, if any, fishery specialists believe that foreign
overfishing beyond 200 miles was the primary cause of the "collapse" of
the Canadian ground fishery closer to shore.
On behalf of the fishing communities, sociologists often provide the
field of fishery management with the voice of popular resentment.
Usually local community resentment is directed against a supposedly
unfeeling central government, especially in a federal country as large as
Canada or the United States. A low level of local compliance with
government measures-or a low level of enforcement-is often attrib-
uted to insufficient delegation of fishery management roles, which
16. Parsons, supra note 1 at 159-192.
17. Ibid. at 193-221.
18. Many fishermen over the years have regarded scientists as their natural enemy. One,
understandably anonymous, source has suggested that it is "a standard ploy the world over to
try to discredit the scientific advice as a first defence against the implementation of rational
fisheries management schemes". Quoted in ibid. at 568. On the misreporting problem, see J.J.
Maguire et al., "What Are We Managing Anyway? The Need for An Interdisciplinary
Approach to Managing Fisheries Ecosystems" (1995) 18 Dalhousie L.J. [see Table of Contents
of this issue].
19. E. Meltzer, "Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: The
Nonsustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries" (1994) 25 OD.I.L. 255. For a Canadian
governmental perspective, see also B. Applebaum, "Straddling Stocks: International Law and
the Northwest Atlantic Problem" in L.S. Parsons & W.H. Lear, eds., supra note I at 193.
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undermines the credibility of the management system as a whole.20
Sociologists emphasize value conflict or cultural alienation as a root
cause of fishery management failure. The special entitlements conceded
to indigenous peoples in Canada and elsewhere 21 are seen to contribute to
the mix of communal resentments, requiring faith to be placed in the
possibility of balancing the protection of special legal rights with the
mediation of conflicting interests.
Ecologists argue that management failure is due to underperception of
the problems to be dealt with. Even a modest extension of fishery science
encompasses "associated or dependent species", 22 including non-target
species that exist at one stage above or below the food-chain level of the
target species. The recent abundance of certain seals in the Northwest
Atlantic may have contributed substantially to the demise of the ground
fishery.23 But ecological enthusiasm elsewhere has resulted in the exag-
geration of by-catch concerns in the case of large-scale driftnetting in the
Pacific Ocean. 4 Recourse to misrepresentation does not provide much
comfort to those asked to accept the ecological approach to fishery
management as an advance in rationality. On the other hand, ecological
20. Parsons, supra note 1 at 625-653; J.W. Lavers and I.S. Stewart, "Fisheries Surveillance
and Enforcement" in D. VanderZwaag, ed., supra note 8 at 173. To describe the matter as an
"enforcement problem" is to assume that the fault lies chiefly with those responsible for
enforcement. To call it a "non-compliance problem" suggests that the fishermen are chiefly at
fault. Neither phrase captures the relational nature of the problem.
21. Parsons, supra note 1 at 420-430. On the aboriginal right to fish in Canada, see B.H.
Wildsmith, "The Mi'kmaq and the Fishery: Beyond Food Requirements" (1995) 18 Dalhousie
L.J. [see Table of Contents this issue. See also M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and Marine
Resources: Understanding Rights, Directions for Management" in D. VanderZwaag, ed.,
supra note 8 at 393; M.J. Valencia and D. VanderZwaag, "Maritime Claims and Management
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Rising Tides in the Pacific and Northern Waters" (1989) 12
Ocean and Shoreline Management 125.
22. The need to protect not only target species but also associated and dependent species is
acknowledged in various provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS III: namely, Articles 61, 63, and
119. Some degree of ecological awareness is also reflected in marine pollution provisions such
as Articles 195 and 196, due mainly to the intervention of the nongovernmental 1UCN (the
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, now re-named the
World Conservation Union).
23. At the time of writing (February, 1995) it appears that the Canadian government has
decided to re-activate the Newfoundland seal fishery, whose population has mounted rapidly
since the closure in 1991. This decision is apparently in response to the requests for re-opening
by the Atlantic provinces, which allege that the expanding seal poplation has contributed to
the crisis in the Atlantic fisheries. Federal-Provincial-Territorial Conference of Ministers
Responsible for Fisheries, Press Release, (1 Nov. 1994).
24. W.T. Burke et al., "United Nations Resolutions on Driftnet Fishing: An Unsustainable
Precedent for High Seas and Coastal Fisheries Management" (1994) 25 O.D.I.L. 127. See also
E.L. Miles, "Ocean Policy Development in the 1990's: The Uses and Limitations of the
Diplomatic Arena" (Keynote Address presented to the First SEAPOL Tri-regional Conference
on Current Issues in Ocean Law, Policy and Management, Bangkok, 13-16 Dec. 1994).
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awareness may be critical to the development of policy-related (design
and operation) research focussing on "vulnerable areas", which would
seem to require regulation of more-than-usual stringency." Moreover,
ecologists who suspect that management failure can be attributed in part
to the use of "inappropriate technology" also have a useful role to play in
the broadening of research on the effects of gear selection beyond the
target species.
Last, but clearly not least, fishery failure may be ascribed to misman-
agement, in the sense of "inappropriate measures", such as the single
species quota system, which has been accused of causing the present
crisis in the Canadian Atlantic groundfishery.2 6 Like all other explana-
tions of failure, this kind of charge is difficult to substantiate. In the eye
of administrators, fishery management may be closer to art than to
science. Choice of overall regulatory strategy is a judgment call.27
Experimentation along the lines of any particular strategy may require a
decade at least to allow for short-term fluctuations to be discounted.
Indeed, even after a 10-year period, the abundance of potentially relevant
variables in fishery management may preclude the validation of any
explanatory theory directed at administrative policy. Furthermore, "mis-
management" belongs to the vocabulary of politics, and explanations of
this kind are always suspect to the extent they reflect the colour of
political sentiment.
III. Impacts of Fishery Failure
In some degree, reaction to a severe case of fishery failure is governed by
how one chooses to characterize the impact of such a crisis. In human
terms, a major fishery failure may be perceived as having adverse effects
at seven levels of society. First, the Canadian Atlantic collapse or
disappearance has a national significance, at least in the view of politi-
cians and economists, since it deprives the Canadian people as a whole
both of food and wealth-creating opportunities. The national level of
25. It is argued elsewhere that "exceptionally dependent coastal communities", such as the
fishing outports of Newfoundland, might be included under a broad concept of "environmental
security zones" that deserve special protection under international law. D.M. Johnston,
"Vulnerable Coastal and Marine Areas: A Framework for the Planning of Environmental
Security Zones in the Ocean" (1993) 24 O.D.I.L. 63 at 71-72. See also R. Graham etal., "The
Protection of Special Marine and Coastal Areas" in D. VanderZwaag, ed., supra note 8 at 341.
26. P. Underwood, "To Manage Quotas or Manage Fisheries? The Root Cause of Misman-
agement of Canada's Ground Fish Fishery" (1995) 18 Dalhousie L.J. [see Table of Contents
of this issue].
27. On the techniques of fishery management applied in Canada, see Parsons, supra note 1
at 77-91.
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perception is crucial, because normally only the national or central
government can provide compensation or alternative relief to those most
directly affected. Relief policy is directed at the second level of impact,
the regional economy placed under severe stress as a result of the failure:
especially the province of Newfoundland in the Canadian situation. In the
industrial context, the consequences are felt at corporate and sectoral
levels, which may vary with the structure of the industry as a whole and
with the kind of industrial organization associated with the species landed
in each port or section of the coastline. For sociologists, it may be more
important to assess the impacts of fishery failure at the communal level,
since a uniform reaction at a higher level of analysis may overlook the
extent of differential effects. Some fishing communities have alternative
sources of livelihood or a viable system of intra-communal support;
others do not. At the sub-communal level, one can examine the conse-
quences for particularly vulnerable sections of the community, such as
women or children or elderly dependents.2 8 Class theory might suggest
that members of the "working class" or subclass of a fishing community,
having less opportunity to accumulate savings, are the chief victims of a
major fishery failure. 29 In the alternative, in communities with a "close
family structure" it might be best to examine the effects of such a crisis
at the sixth level, that of the household, where intra-familial support and
dependency arrangements are worked out before or after the trauma.3"
Finally, of course, an effort can be made to measure the human cost of a
fishery collapse at the level of the individuals most directly affected, but
this approach may be the most likely of all to inject inequities into the
policy of compensation and supplementary relief.
In non-anthropocentric terms, the impacts of major fishery failure can
be studied at no less, and probably more, than six levels of significance.
The normal commercial reaction may be framed around the stock or
stocks that seem to have collapsed, disappeared, or migrated to an
unknown locality. Some scientists, however, are more likely to concen-
trate on the species, or combinations of species, that contribute to the
stock; or on the area which is designated as the unit of management; or
on the entire ecosystem which seems to have been subjected to intolerable
stress. For those associated with large-scale international fishery research
or management commissions, it may be necessary to investigate the
28. (see comment/request on front cover).
29. During the Gulf of Maine fish feud between Canada and the United States in the 1970s,
one U.S. opponent of the agreement negotiated between the two governments claimed that the
"working class" component of the New England fishing industry would be the principal victim
of such an arrangement, which was based on a model of cooperative fishery management.
30. J.J. Maguire, supra note 18.
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disaster at the level of the macro-region encompassed by the members of
the organization. At the highest level of the six, the global community, a
world body such as Food and Agricultural Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) or United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), or
even the UN General Assembly, might be pressed to begin a careful
investigation of all current or recent fishery failures of crisis proportions
because of their cumulative impact on the world's food production
systems and the prospect of systemic catastrophe for the world's expand-
ing population.3'
IV. Comparative Perspectives
One of the weaker features of fishery management as a field of inquiry is
the relative neglect of comparative studies. The comparative analysis of
disastrous fishery failures of comparable magnitude might help to correct
some misconceptions arising from studies that focus sharply on local
factors or conditions in a particular crisis.32 In the country most directly
affected, scholarly detachment may not be as easily achieved as its
scholars would like to believe. Even the most "objective" of scholarly
observers may be affected emotionally by the need to empathize with the
victims of the disaster or the desire to allocate blame. If Canadians were
well-suited to analyze the collapse of the Peruvian anchoveta fishery in
the early 1970s,33 Chilean or other non-Canadian experts might be invited
to contribute to a dispassionate analysis of the Canadian collapse of the
1990s.
Further benefits in the form of comparative insight are less likely to be
gained from historical research that goes back much further in time than
the 1960s. In the absence of data, we can only speculate on the disappear-
31. While the present UN conference on straddling stocks is an appropriate- and for Canada
an important - initiative to correct an environmental deficiency of UNCLOS II, it has little
to contribute directly to the problem of fishery collapse. If this problem is to be seriously
addressed, drastic improvements in fishery management within national limits must be
effected. Admittedly, the global conference arena has a role to play in the shaping of national
fishery management, and the relevant principles of sustainability and precaution, which were
adopted at UNCED, are being refined by FAO as well as at the straddling stocks conference.
Preferably, the problem of fishery collapse should be on UNEP's list of top environmental
priorities and a world-level effort should be mounted to deal comprehensively with this
phenomenon of systemic failure.
32. For a good example of this kind, see R. Apostle and K.H. Mikalsen, "Lessons from the
Abyss: Reflections on Recent Fisheries Crises in Atlantic Canada and North Norway" (1995)
18 Dalhousie L.J. [see Table of Contents of this issue].
33. Canadian biologist Lloyd Dickie led a team of Canadian scientists engaged by the
Peruvian government in the early 1970s to assist Peruvian scientists to investigate the causes
of the collapse of the anchoveta fishery off the coast of Peru, previously the world's largest
single-species fishery.
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ance of the famous herring fishery of the North Sea in the late 15th
century, which some historians have blamed for the collapse of the
Hanseatic League of Northern Europe.3" Yet even this kind of remote
reference may serve the purpose of warning sceptical contemporaries that
the current disaster might also be transformational, and not merely
disruptive, in its consequences. Historical insight may be needed to keep
alive the awful possibility that none of the currently debated initiatives in
"crisis management" may be sufficient to maintain the economic and
social structures of Newfoundland beyond the turn of the century.
In order to gather ideas on how to cope more effectively with the
consequences of a fishery disaster, specialists in fishery management
might do well to consult with specialists in other fields where disasters
have had long-term consequences for large numbers of people or for a
large-scale sector of the environment. The disasters of Chernobyl and
Bhopal come to mind as comparable in magnitude, though very different
in origin and in their impacts on human health. Comparison with near-
extinction of a non-fish species such as the blue whale may also be useful
in illuminating certain aspects of current failures in fishery management
and conservation.35 Closer to home, a Canadian-American collaboration
would be useful to compare the causes and effects of fishery failure in
New England with those of the collapse in Atlantic Canada.
V. Projections and Appraisals
Specialists in the field of fishery management have a responsibility to be
of practical utility to society at large in their discernment and projection
of trends and development of policy recommendations. To outsiders it
might seem reasonable that the credibility of the field should rise or fall
according to the success or failure of the experts in projection and
appraisal.
However, such expectations may not be as reasonable as they appear
on the outside. All fields come into existence as a response to complexity.
In the case of fishery management, the "problems" are not really "soluble"
in any resolutive sense. Of the innumerable factors that bear upon
34. The Hanseatic League was a medieval association of North European (mostly German)
towns and commercial groups abroad founded to protect their common trading interests. The
herring and cod fisheries of the North Sea and the Baltic were the most valuable single
component of the North European trade system. The decline of the League in the early 16th
century began shortly after the disappearance of the major herring fisheries. This famous
"collapse" is believed to be due to a 1 Celsius rise in surface water temperature that resulted
in a northernward migration that could not be understood and monitored under existing
conditions of ocean science and technology.
35. Johnston, supra note 8 at 396-411.
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performance in fishery development and management, many (and prob-
ably most) are beyond the "control" of any institution at any level of
society, above or below the national. In the sphere of economic affairs
(economic development and management) we are now learning that
some of the basic problems associated with control, especially those
dependent on savings and investment, can only be influenced in some
degree by government measures. A higher degree of influence, if not
control, resides in an amorphous grouping of large-scale investors (a
sector of the international investment community), which does not exist
in any institutional form and therefore cannot be identified, approached,
and persuaded or cajoled. In the sphere of fishery affairs it is even more
difficult to identify the chief locus of influence, and the notion of effective
control in a context as elusive as fishery management may be the product
of self-deception.
Fortunately, prospects are not entirely bleak. It appears that most of the
catastrophic fishery failures could have been kept to a non-catastrophic
level, if some of the advice offered by the biologists and economists, who
remain at the centre of fishery policy-making, had been acceptable at the
political level. In recent years the useful, but admittedly still vague,
concepts of sustainability and a "precautionary approach" to fishery
management 6 have become part of the politically acceptable vocabulary
in the diplomatic arena, and in some countries, including Canada, these
concepts are now in the process of adaptation to serve national policy
purposes. Each of the various mind-sets discussed in this essay, and
represented by the contributors to this issue, has a role to play in the
development of sustainable and precautionary policies and practices at
global, regional, national, and subnational level of fishery management.
If any cross-disciplinary field as diverse and difficult as fishery manage-
ment needs unifying core concepts for the participating disciplinary
mind-sets to rally around, then the politically acceptable concepts of
sustainability and precaution should be welcomed.
Most cross-disciplinary fields are bound by their nature to reflect a
potentially divisive degree of dissonance. Each discipline projects its
own, highly developed, mind-set which strives to be autonomous and
tends, therefore, to be incompatible with other disciplinary mind-sets.
Within the field of fishery management, the tendency to dissonance is
particularly apt to lead to incompatible modes of projection and appraisal.
A policy favouring cross-disciplinary collaboration at the policy-setting
level offers no guarantee of a fusion of minds.
36. For a review of the precautionary principle in Canada and other national legal systems.
See ibid. at 36.
Stresses and Mind-sets in Fishery Management
Fishery biologists, dependent on data that can never be sufficiently
comprehensive or completely reliable, accept that fishery management
can only be approximate;37 and that management decisions can only be
given a firmer, less uncertain, scientific foundation through continuous
investments in expensive, mostly long-term, research projects. Fishery
economists work with shorter, politically realistic, time-scales, and their
considerations of efficiency, incentive, and profitability encourage the
belief that fishery management objectives can be precisely defined; but
their prescriptions tend to be too draconian, in normal times, to be
politically or socially acceptable.38 Sociologists inject sympathy into
fishery policy-making by portraying fishing communities as victims not
only of an industry made volatile by the fluctuations of nature, but also
of governmental incompetence or insensitivity; but their advice is the
least "scientific" and the most "political" in the sense of reflecting
sectional interest.39 Marine ecologists take the broadest view of att, but
the research needed to validate their hypotheses would be the most
expensive and their model of cooperation for a complex federal state like
Canada may be unrealistic.40
Each of these disciplines, then, presents its own, internally reinforced,
order of rationality and its own brand of faith. Five faiths seem to contend
37. It is difficult for fishery scientists to meet the expectations of fishery managers and
administrators, and probably impossible to meet those of the general public. The expectations
of the latter, and possibly of fishermen also are higher than are necessary for effective
conservation. Scientific advice should be expected to be consistent, and this is perhaps at least
as imp<ortant as it to be acurate or precise. W .G. Do'ubteda , "Retiability of Scientiftc Advice
on Fishery Management Measures" in L.S. Parsons and W.H. Lear, eds., supra note 1 at 369.
On the credibility of scientific advice to fishery managers, see Parsons, supra note 1 at 568-
575.
38. Ibid. at 621. Sometimes task force recommendations fail to be implemented not because
of lack of merit but because of industrial hostility. L.S. Parsons, "Shaping Fisheries Policy: The
Kirby and Pearse Inquiries-Process, Prescription and Impact" in L.S. Parsons & W.H. Lear,
eds., supra note 1 at 408. Since its establishment in the late 1860s, the Canadian federal
Department of Fisheries has received reports from over 100 task forces, royal commissions,
and special inquiries. Not even one of these reports has been fully implemented. Ibid. at 386.
39. For example, sociologists almost always support the "underdog", which means inshore
fishermen as opposed to offshore corporate interests.
40. In the 1970s the Atlantic provinces and Quebec argued in favour of a larger (concurrent
or paramount) role in fishery management, and the same argument was heard during the Meech
Laker -- gotixs in the thly t99s. This k , of popyosa1 has onsistetkf bee r teded, Qr
politely set aside, by the federal government on the ground that the "balkanization" of the
Canadian fisheries would eliminate the possibility of fair and effective fishery management.
Parsons, supra note 1 at 19-34. Now, in the post-Meech era, the federal, provincial and
territorial ministers responsible can agree only on the need for closer and continuous
consultation on fishery management issues. It is difficult to envisage an "ecosystem manage-
ment" approach that would not complicate further the delicate jurisdictional balance, since any
designated large-scale ecosystem would overlap existing jurisdictional lines, thereby creating
another kind of "straddling stock".
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for allegiance in the 1990s. First, in Canada more than most countries
official policy emphasizes socio-economic priorities in the objectives of
fishery management.4' At the global level the trend in prescriptions is
somewhat similar.42 Downsizing of the industry is under way; but social
objectives are often incompatible with the economic, and an overempha-
sis on the latter could result in social disorder. Second, faith in conserva-
tion or sustainability is a motif of the 1990s, but biologists and ecologists
differ, often radically, on how to focus their conservation efforts: stock,
species, ecosystem, or region. Faith in the ecosystem approach seems to
be on the rise in some Western countries, but there is third world concern
that dogma may displace reason.43 Third, environmentalism is in part a
rejection of technology or at least of certain modes of industrial technol-
ogy that seem to pose threats to vulnerable sectors of the environment.
Faith in appropriate technology, modified by the need for a precautionary
approach to environmental management, seems unexceptionable in prin-
ciple, but it has led to the mobilization of dogma and deceit in diplomatic
practice." Fourth, sympathy with peripheral and disadvantaged fishing
communities has popularized the faith that more effective and more
equitable fishery management would ensue, if controls were delegated to
the local community level. Carried too far, such a policy of delegation
would surely increase, not diminish, the politicization or deprofes-
sionalization of fishery management. It may be safer for Canada to follow
the less dangerous, if costly, course of closer consultation among federal,
provincial, and territorial levels of government and between government,
41. Canada has given special weight to the socio-economic objectives offishery management
since adoption of the seminal, reformist document Policy for Canada's Commercial Fisheries
by W.C. Mackenzie et al. (Ottawa: Fisheries and Marine Sciences, Department of the
Environment, 1976). See also Gough, supra note 1 at 37.
42. Most countries trail behind Canada in the adoption and implementation of socio-
economic objectives and methods of fishery management. On the need for international
acceptance of a bio-economic approach, E.L. Miles, "The International Dimension of Fisheries
Management: Past, Present & Future" (Paper based on presentation to SEAPOL Conference
on sustainable Development of Coastal and Marine Areas, Singapore, May 1994).
43. Western delegations at UNCED in 1992 failed to persuade the Conference to incorporate
into Agenda 21 a provision favouring a "large ecosystem" approach to ocean management.
Apart from the special political reasons for opposing this 'U.S.-backed proposal, developing
coastal states have a more general reason to fear the impact of the ecosystem management
approach on their hard-earned jurisdictional prerogatives designed into the regime of the
exclusive economic regime. Adoption of this proposal at Rio would have widened the gap
between the UNCLOS III and UNCED paradigms. On the clash of mind-sets, see D.M.
Johnston, "Protection of the Ocean Environment: Competing Views of the Implementation
Process" (Paper presented to the meeting of the Ocean Governance Group, Honolulu, 9-11
January, 1995).
44. See Burke et al., supra note 24.
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the community, and special interests.45 Finally, Brundtland and Rio have
publicized the case for integrated coastal management, locking on to the
logic of interdependence. But this logic works less for the need for
coherence within the field of fishery management than for coherence
within the even larger and more complex field of "ocean management".
Normally the latter is a theoretical construct, mocking the structure of
government, but it appears that the federal government may now be ready
to raise the priority of marine affairs in this country by promoting DFO
to the level of a superministry for the oceans. 46 If structure is, finally, to
follow the logic of function, then faith in integration may deserve its own
cathedral.
45. This policy of close three-level consultation was re-affirmed in November 1994. See
Fedet1-arovi~iaTerCtori1 Cn1ZienZt of Ministrs Retsponsibk fDT Fishtlit, Press
Release, t November, 1994.
46. At the time of writing it has been announced that the Canadian Coast Guard will be
incorporated into DFO, but this is expected to be only the first step toward the enlargement of
the Department into a superministry through the incorporation of other ocean-related units
currently located in Environment Canada, Energy Mines and Resources, and other agencies.
The new ministry will be responsible for administration of the new Oceans Act, which is
expected to be introduced into the House of Commons sometime in 1995. On the concept of
such a superministry and other options, see Johnston, supra note 6 at 59-61.



